超简单:使用ghidra_12.2反汇编android.hardware.boot-service.qti实现防止一加13的Coloros17内核熔断并保留9008权限(双保险)
在前一篇文章中我提供了修改反汇编修改qcom-scm.ko实现防止一加13的Coloros17内核熔断,这次为了在应用层实现“双保险”,我们需要修改 android.hardware.boot-service.qti,使其在开机时向内核节点 /sys/kernel/dload/update_arb 写入字符 '0'(而不是原有的 '1'),从而在内核层面直接触发 kstrtobool("0") 的 false 分支,完全终止后续的熔断逻辑。
如何解包vendor并打包的方法我在https://yuanfangblog.xyz/technology/931.html与https://xdaforums.com/t/manual-upgrade-of-oneplus-13-to-16-0-8-301-while-preserving-edl-9008-access.4793082/中已提到过,这里不再赘述,按我之前的那篇文章提取vendor.img,并且挂载后提取android.hardware.boot-service.qti备用,该文件位于所挂载文件夹的/bin/hw目录下。
我们在ghidra中创建项目后导入android.hardware.boot-service.qti文件,选择analyze后,在顶部菜单栏点击 Search -> For Strings,然后在下面过滤器中输入/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb
如图,在弹出窗口中双击带地址那个:

在listing窗口中可以看到如图:

右键点击该字符串地址,选择 References -> Show References to Address如图

右侧Decompile窗口可以看到伪代码:
/* aidl::android::hardware::boot::BootControl::markBootSuccessful() */
void __thiscall aidl::android::hardware::boot::BootControl::markBootSuccessful(undefined8 *param_1)
{
string sVar1;
string sVar2;
long lVar3;
int iVar4;
undefined8 uVar5;
ssize_t sVar6;
int *piVar7;
char *pcVar8;
size_t sVar9;
string *psVar10;
uint extraout_w1;
undefined8 *extraout_x8;
void *pvVar11;
string local_98;
string sStack_97;
undefined6 uStack_96;
undefined2 local_90;
undefined6 uStack_8e;
void *local_88;
ulong local_80;
size_t local_78;
void *local_70;
undefined6 local_68;
undefined2 uStack_62;
undefined6 uStack_60;
long local_58;
lVar3 = tpidr_el0;
local_58 = *(long *)(lVar3 + 0x28);
iVar4 = mark_boot_successful();
if (iVar4 != 0) {
uVar5 = AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(0xfffffffe,"Operation failed");
*param_1 = uVar5;
goto LAB_00105bcc;
}
local_98 = (string)0x0;
sStack_97 = (string)0x0;
uStack_96 = 0;
local_90 = 0;
uStack_8e = 0;
local_88 = (void *)0x0;
iVar4 = __open_2("/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb",0x80001);
if (iVar4 < 0) {
piVar7 = (int *)__errno();
pcVar8 = strerror(*piVar7);
sVar9 = strlen(pcVar8);
if (0xffffffffffffffef < sVar9) goto LAB_00105c00;
if (sVar9 < 0x17) {
pvVar11 = (void *)((ulong)&local_80 | 1);
local_80 = CONCAT71(local_80._1_7_,(char)((int)sVar9 << 1));
if (sVar9 != 0) goto LAB_001059f8;
}
else {
pvVar11 = operator.new((sVar9 | 0xf) + 1);
local_80 = (sVar9 | 0xf) + 2;
local_78 = sVar9;
local_70 = pvVar11;
LAB_001059f8:
memmove(pvVar11,pcVar8,sVar9);
}
*(undefined1 *)((long)pvVar11 + sVar9) = 0;
pcVar8 = "open failed: ";
LAB_00105b2c:
psVar10 = (string *)std::string::insert((ulong)&local_80,(char *)0x0,(ulong)pcVar8);
sVar1 = *psVar10;
uVar5 = *(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 8);
pvVar11 = *(void **)(psVar10 + 0x10);
sVar2 = psVar10[1];
*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 8) = 0;
*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 0x10) = 0;
*(undefined8 *)psVar10 = 0;
local_68 = (undefined6)*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 2);
uStack_62 = (undefined2)uVar5;
uStack_60 = (undefined6)((ulong)uVar5 >> 0x10);
if (((byte)local_98 & 1) != 0) {
operator.delete(local_88);
}
uStack_96 = local_68;
local_90 = uStack_62;
uStack_8e = uStack_60;
local_98 = sVar1;
sStack_97 = sVar2;
local_88 = pvVar11;
if ((local_80 & 1) != 0) {
operator.delete(local_70);
}
}
else {
do {
__cfi_slowpath(0x66eda147f15013b2,write);
sVar6 = write(iVar4,&DAT_001020e6,1);
if (-1 < sVar6) {
if (sVar6 == 0) {
std::string::__assign_external(&local_98,"write returned 0 with data remaining",0x24);
goto LAB_00105adc;
}
iVar4 = close(iVar4);
if (iVar4 == 0) goto LAB_00105bb4;
piVar7 = (int *)__errno();
pcVar8 = strerror(*piVar7);
sVar9 = strlen(pcVar8);
if (0xffffffffffffffef < sVar9) goto LAB_00105c00;
if (sVar9 < 0x17) {
pvVar11 = (void *)((ulong)&local_80 | 1);
local_80 = CONCAT71(local_80._1_7_,(char)((int)sVar9 << 1));
if (sVar9 != 0) goto LAB_00105b04;
}
else {
pvVar11 = operator.new((sVar9 | 0xf) + 1);
local_80 = (sVar9 | 0xf) + 2;
local_78 = sVar9;
local_70 = pvVar11;
LAB_00105b04:
memmove(pvVar11,pcVar8,sVar9);
}
pcVar8 = "close failed: ";
*(undefined1 *)((long)pvVar11 + sVar9) = 0;
goto LAB_00105b2c;
}
piVar7 = (int *)__errno();
} while (*piVar7 == 4);
pcVar8 = strerror(*piVar7);
sVar9 = strlen(pcVar8);
if (0xffffffffffffffef < sVar9) {
LAB_00105c00:
std::string::__throw_length_error[abi:nn180000]();
iVar4 = set_active_boot_slot(extraout_w1);
if (iVar4 == 0) {
uVar5 = AStatus_newOk();
}
else {
uVar5 = AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(0xfffffffe,"Operation failed");
}
*extraout_x8 = uVar5;
return;
}
if (sVar9 < 0x17) {
pvVar11 = (void *)((ulong)&local_80 | 1);
local_80 = CONCAT71(local_80._1_7_,(char)((int)sVar9 << 1));
if (sVar9 != 0) goto LAB_00105a40;
}
else {
pvVar11 = operator.new((sVar9 | 0xf) + 1);
local_80 = (sVar9 | 0xf) + 2;
local_78 = sVar9;
local_70 = pvVar11;
LAB_00105a40:
memmove(pvVar11,pcVar8,sVar9);
}
*(undefined1 *)((long)pvVar11 + sVar9) = 0;
psVar10 = (string *)std::string::insert((ulong)&local_80,(char *)0x0,0x101fb9);
sVar1 = *psVar10;
uVar5 = *(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 8);
pvVar11 = *(void **)(psVar10 + 0x10);
sVar2 = psVar10[1];
*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 8) = 0;
*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 0x10) = 0;
*(undefined8 *)psVar10 = 0;
local_68 = (undefined6)*(undefined8 *)(psVar10 + 2);
uStack_62 = (undefined2)uVar5;
uStack_60 = (undefined6)((ulong)uVar5 >> 0x10);
if (((byte)local_98 & 1) != 0) {
operator.delete(local_88);
}
uStack_96 = local_68;
local_90 = uStack_62;
uStack_8e = uStack_60;
local_98 = sVar1;
sStack_97 = sVar2;
local_88 = pvVar11;
if ((local_80 & 1) != 0) {
operator.delete(local_70);
}
LAB_00105adc:
close(iVar4);
}
pvVar11 = (void *)((ulong)&local_98 | 1);
if (((byte)local_98 & 1) != 0) {
pvVar11 = local_88;
}
__android_log_print(6,0,"update_arb sysfs write failed: %s",pvVar11);
LAB_00105bb4:
uVar5 = AStatus_newOk();
*param_1 = uVar5;
if (((byte)local_98 & 1) != 0) {
operator.delete(local_88);
}
LAB_00105bcc:
if (*(long *)(lVar3 + 0x28) != local_58) {
/* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
__stack_chk_fail();
}
return;
}
仔细分析下代码的逻辑可以发现sVar6 = write(iVar4, &DAT_001020e6, 1);中有个write的动作,这里代码的1表示写了一个字节,双击DAT_001020e6在跳转到的listing窗口看到写入的具体内容。

如图和伪代码,它向/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb写入了1
iVar4 = __open_2("/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb", 0x80001);
// ...
sVar6 = write(iVar4, &DAT_001020e6, 1);
其中:iVar4:open 返回的文件描述符。
&DAT_001020e6:要写入的数据在内存中的指针地址。
1:要写入的字节长度(写入 1 个字节)。
所以我们的思路就来了,那就是把写入的1改为0,让用户态的android.hardware.boot-service.qti向/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb写入0以避免熔断。
在ASCII码中,31代表1,30代表0,所以我们直接修改31为30即可,从上图listing窗口地址猜测31后面应该紧跟着00(字符串结束符地址在001020e7),这里有个极其简单的方法,绝大多数人都可以操作,直接使用winhex搜索16进制3100,改成3000即可,因为我已经找到了逻辑,后面如果绿厂不修改源码,大家可以简单的通过修改这个文件来防熔断而不需要复杂的逆向!!
注意用winhex搜索3100会出现多个,在/sys/kernel/dload/update_arb附近的那个才是我们需要改的!!

只需要改个字节就可以实现防熔断,你就说简不简单,完全没有任何难度。
改后最好拖入ghidra验证一下,如图改后的效果:

后续你只需要按照我之前的教程把android.hardware.boot-service.qti打包进vendor.img在重启前刷入即可,同时别忘了重启前刷入旧版本(推荐16.0.1.303)abl_a、xbl_a、xbl_config_a、xbl_ramdump_a分区确保arb=0。
这里顺便提供个改好的Coloros 17.0.0.103国行版的qcom-scm.ko和android.hardware.boot-service.qti,vendor.img太大了,小水管放不下,大家自行打包,如果不会打包可以把我的文章喂给ai让agent操作。
下载:PJZ110_17.0.0.103(CN01) F.07.zip
进行上述操作的前提是必须解锁bl禁用vbmeta,同时本身设备没有熔断,如果你的设备已经熔断,贸然刷入只会导致黑砖,建议小范围传播,以免绿厂修改代码。
仅供学习研究使用。
感谢,我试了下你提供的android.hardware.boot-service.qti重新打包进vendor,我只修改了vendor,用了16.0.1.303的abl_a、xbl_a、xbl_config_a、xbl_ramdump_a,没动内核成功保下了arb。
单纯修改内核和修改vendor都可以保arb,两样都弄更保险些,因为你永远晓不得厂商会搞啥幺蛾子,万一偷偷改了代码都没地儿哭。
问题是我现在在coloros 17.0.0.103,进不了fastboot,后续搞坏了系统没办法方便救砖
有9008还怕什么变砖,那你看看能不能进fastbootd,或者刷个第三方recovery,也许可以试一试刷旧版16.0.1.303的engineering_cdt,看能不能进fastboot,我也不清楚这有没有效,因为我刚刚又刷回coloros 16了,不喜欢17的玻璃效果,尤其是下拉通知栏的那些椭圆形,个人觉得16的圆角矩形还要好看些。